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Analysis of the Display and Control Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation o_ FMEA and C_L, _0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Displays and
Control hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential
critical items. TO preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L
updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy is provided
through additional analysis as required. This report documents
the results of that comparison for the Orbiter D&C hardware.
The IOA product for D&C analysis consisted of one-hundred
thirty-four failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in eight (8)
potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made
to the NASA baseline of 4 January 1988 which consisted of two-
hundred sixty-four (264) FMEAs and twenty one CIL items. The
comparison determined if there were any results which had been
found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but forty-five (45) FMEAs
which caused no differences in the CIL items. Reference Figure i.
The issues arose due to different interpretation of NSTS 22206,
FMEA and CIL preparation instruction. IOA analyzed the electrical
circuit as a black box, and NASA analyzed the components of the
black boxes. Of the forty-five (45) differences with the FMEA's,
all were minor and did not affect criticalities assessment. In
conclusion, IOA is in full agreement with the revised NASA CIL
baseline.
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/i I 2/IR 2/2
Number : 0 16 0
3/IR 3/2R 1 3/3 I TOTAL58 5 92 171
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
+
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
2/IR 2/2 1 3/IR 1 3/2R TOTAL
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Figure 1 - D&C OVERVIEW ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office
has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the
Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL re-evaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
re-evaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized
in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 D&C Ground Rules and Assumptions
The D&C ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The function of the D&C hardware is to provide the crew with the
monitor, command, and control capabilities required for
management of all normal and contingency mission and flight
operations.
Figure 2 is an overview of the D&C hardware for which failure
modes analysis was performed. For the analysis, the hardware was
divided into the following five categories:
I. FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS - These categories
includes the displays that allows manual control of the
vehicle, provide monitoring of automatic control
performance, and provide display of critical flight
parameters. The components of this category are:
(i) G-METER (6) PQI
(2) AMI (7) SPI
(3) AVVI (8) HSI
(4) ADI (9) FLT CNTL PWR
(5) HUD
Figures 3 - i0 provide a hardware breakdown of each of
the above components.
II. CAUTION AND WARNING - This category consists of those
components that inform the crew of out-of-limit
conditions of the vehicle. This category consist of the
following:
(I) ANNUNCIATOR (CWA)
(2) LIMIT MODULE (CWLM)
(3) ELECTRONIC UNIT (CWE)
Figure ii provides a hardware breakdown of each of the
above components.
III. DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT - This category consists of the
electronic unit that provides the interface between
the GPC and the primary flight displays. The function
of this unit is to i) decode data signals from the GPC
and convert these signals to display driver commands,
2) provide ac and dc operating power to the ADI, and
3) set flag on the dedicated displays. The hardware in
this category is the DDU.
Figure 12 is a hardware breakdown of this component.
IV. TIMING DISPLAYS - This category provide the crew with





Figures 13 - 14 provides a hardware breakdown of these
components•
V• LIGHTING - This category consist of the components that
allows illumination of displays and controls, payload
bay operations, EVA's, RMS operations, and docking
operations. The components of this category are:
(I) INTERIOR LIGHTING
(2) EXTERIOR LIGHTING
Figures 15 - 16 provides a hardware breakdown of these
components.
A brief description of the flight displays and annunciators,
caution and warning, display driver unit, timing displays, and
lighting is provided below.
i. One self contained G-METER located on panel F7. It senses
linear acceleration along the Z-body axis of the vehicle.
•
Two AMI's one at the CDRs station and one at the PLTs
station• These provide angle of attack, mach/velocity,
equivalent airspeed, and acceleration information to the
crew.
• Two AVVIs, located on panels F6 and FS. They provide
altitude acceleration, altitude rate, barometric altitude,
and radar altitude information to the crew.
•
Three ADI located on panel F6, F8, and A6. These provide
simultaneous display of attitude, attitude angular rate,
and attitude error information to the crew.
.
Two HUDs located at the CDR and PLT stations. These provide
the crew with information required for landing.
• Two Propellant Quantity Indicators located on panel F6 and
F8 to provide the crew with the amount of propellant
remaining.
•
Two SPIs located at CDR and PLT stations• The Surface
Position Indicators allows the crew to view the status of
the aerosurfaces of the vehicle•
• Caution and Warning - The function of this system is to
inform the crew of out-of-limit conditions of predetermined
parameters of the vehicle•
•
Annunciator Control Assembly - This system provides visual
indication of Orbiter status (emergency/warning - RED,
caution - YELLOW, and advisory - WHITE).
i0. Display Driver Unit - The function of this unit is to
provide the interface between the GPC and the primary flight
displays•
Ii. Timing displays provide the crew with time referenced to
Greenwitch Mean Time, liftoff, or to a particular event.
12. Lighting - The function of this system is to provide
illumination of the controllers, numeric displays, interior,
and exterior of the vehicle.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The D&C hardware is located through the Orbiter. The precise
location for each component switch circuit is provided on the
analysis worksheets in Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA87001-06.
The D&C hardware is interfaced with the software via the flight
critical MDMs. Switch and power status is monitored via the
flight critical MDMs and operational instrumentation.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of the D&C into its hardware





















































































































































































































































































Fiqure 10 - D&C _LT/VBRTXC_L V_LOCXTY XNDXC_T02 (&VVX)
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Figure 16 - D&C BXTBRIOR LIGHTING
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the D&C hardware initially generated one
hundred thirty four failure mode worksheets and identified eight
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. In order to facilitate comparison, thirty additional
failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis
results were compared to the NASA Post 51-L baseline of two-
hundred sixty-four (264) FMEAs and twenty one CIL items, which
were generated using the i0 October 1986 FMEA/CIL instructions.
Upon completion of the assessment two-hundred-nineteen (219) of
the FMEAs were in agreement. Of the forty-five (45) that
remained, all had minor discrepancies that did not affect
criticality.
The D&C assessment was divided into the following five categories:
I. FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS
II. CAUTION AND WARNING
III. DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
IV. TIMING DISPLAYS
V. LIGHTING
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.











A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.









Table III presents a summary of IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the D&C subsystem for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline.
Table III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities




6 3/3 1 TOTAL96 171
Table IV presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the D&C subsystem for the Post 51-L baseline.
I Table IV
+












0 3/3 1 TOTALI0 21
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed.
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding
IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains new IOA analysis worksheets that cover
failure modes that were not included in the original analysis.
These worksheets were added in order to make a comparison with
the NASA FMEAs on these failure modes.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
25
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
+












II. CAUTION AND WARNING
12. ACA
13. PROP QUANT INDICATOR
14. INT & EXT LIGHTING
15. INST PWR CKT
16. MEAS ISO RESISTOR
17. PWR CHT - FUSES



















The five categories are discussed in the following sections along
with issues, and the recommendations for the Post 51-L FMEA/CIL.
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4.1 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS
Nine components were included in this category. A summary of
the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS
and ANNUNCIATORS, versus the recommended baseline, and any issues
identified is presented in Table VI.
TABLE VI D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATOR




































The issues are the results of failure modes analyzed by IOA that
were not covered by NASA. The results of these analyses did not
raise the criticalities of the components. IOA recommends that
NASA consider these failures for FMEA's.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL assessed for the D&C
flight displays and annunciators, versus the recommended IOA
baseline, and any issues identified is presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII D&C FLIGHT DISPLAY AND ANNUNCIATOR
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment








































Table VIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the D&C flight displays and annunciators for
the Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE VIII D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATOR
















































Table IX presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the D&C Flight Displays and Annunciator for the Post 51-L
baseline.
TABLE IX D&C FLIGHT DISPLAY AND ANNUNCIATOR
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items






















4.2 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Three groups make up this category. A summary of the quantity of
NASA FMEAs assessed versus the recommended baseline, and any
issues identified is presented in table X.
TABLE X D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment


















The issues are the results of analyzing the circuitry as black
boxes vs each component of the circuitry. The criticality of
these components were not affected.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table XI.
TABLE XI D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment










Table XII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the D&C Caution and Warning components for the
Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE XII D&C CAUTION AND WARNING























Table XIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items
for the D&C Caution and Warning component for the Post 51-1
baseline.
TABLE XIII D&C CAUTION AND WARNING














4.3 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
One group make up this category. A summary of the quantity of
NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the recommended baseline, and any
issues identified is presented in Table XIV.
+ +
TABLE XIV D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component I NASA I IOA I Issues
i. DDU 22 19 1
TOTAL 2_ 19
The issue arose due to a failure mode analyzed by IOA and not
by NASA. The criticality of the component was not affected.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus
the recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is
presented in Table XV.
TABLE XV D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component I NASA I IOA I Issues
i. DDU I0 i0 0
TOTAL I0 i0 0
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Table XVI presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Display Driver Unit for the Post 51-1
FMEA baseline.
TABLE XVI D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT











Table XVII presents a summary of IOA recommended CIL items
for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XVII D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number: I i/i_ 2/IR14 2/2 3/IR16 3/2R ITOTAL- 10
4.4 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - D&C TIMING
Two groups make up this category. A summary of the quantity of
NASA FMEAs assessed for the D&C Timing, versus the recommended
baseline, and any issues identified is presented in Table XVIII.
TABLE XVIII D&C TIMING
















The issues are the results of IOA analyzing a failure mode
not covered by NASA. The criticality of the components were
not affected.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended baseline, and any issues identified is presented in
Table XIX.
TABLE XIX D&C TIMING

















Table XX presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities of the D&C Timing component for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline.
TABLE XX D&C TIMING














Table XXI presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the D&C Timing component for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XXI D&C TIMING
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
Number . lJli2JIa12I311 I3JRrTOTAL
33
4.5 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - LIGHTING
Two groups make up this category. A summary of the quantity of
NASA FMEAs assessed for the D&C Lighting component, versus the
recommended baseline, and any issues identified is presented in
Table XII.
TABLE XXII D&C LIGHTING













TOTAL I 40 l 6 l 0
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table XXIII.
TABLE XXIII D&C LIGHTING







TOTAL i 0 I 0 i 0
Table XXIV presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the D&C Lighting component for the Post 51-L
FMEA baseline.
TABLE XXIV D&C LIGHTING

















Table XXV presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XXV D&C LIGHTING
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items




Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
i. JSC-18863, Guidance and Control Systems Briefs, 9-30-85
2. CONT 2102, Dedicated Display workbook, 2-1-82
3. SSSH System Drawing 1 G&C DISP 1 DWG 9.1
4. JSC-12820, STS operational Flight Rules, PCN-I, 2-14-86
5. CONT 2102, Caution and Warning Workbook 8-5-83
6. JSC- 11174 SSSH System Drawing 20 HUD, DWG 9.20A
7. VS70-973009 Integrated Schematic HEAD UP DISPLAY 10-22-80
8. DISPLAY and CONTROL FSSR STS83-0020C
9. MC409-0023 DDU Specification 6-6-77
10. JSC - 11174 SSSH System Drawing i0 TIM DWG 8.10
11. VS70-730129, Schematic Diagram, Caution & Warning
11-12-80
12. Shuttle Flight Operation Manual 8-31-84
13. JSC - 11174, SSSH System Drawing C&W DWG 5.2
14. JSC - 18691, FDF Malfunction Procedures 10-10-85
15. VS70-973099, Schematic Diagram, Event & Mission Timers
16. JSC - 11174 SSSH System Drawing OMS GAUGE DWG 11.2





































































Ascent Thrust Vector Control




















Caution and Warning Annunciator
Caution and Warning Electronic
Caution and Warning Limit Module






























































Flight Control Operating System
Flight Control System




Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Summary Message

























Multifunction CRT Display System





























































National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Navigation
Normal
National Space Transportation System
Operational Aft
Operational Forward























Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
Redundant Set
Return To Landing Site














































Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
B-I
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of _MEA/CI_, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCy CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS i (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
_ANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CID, I0 October 1986, was employed with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to






DEFINITIONSe GROUND RULESe AND ASSUMPTIONS
D&C - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The failure analyses will be conducted to the black box
level for components whose output serves only one function
unless a lower level is required to be consistent with the
existing FMEAs.
RATIONALE: The definition credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
For black boxes whose output serves more than one function,
the analysis will go to a level that effects each of the
different functions.
RATIONALE : The defined credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.






Erroneous output (Output that redundancy management
will detect as a failure.)
Premature output (Output occurs without command. This
may not be credible for all black boxes.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function.
Credible failures for switches are defined to be
(I) Fails on (Power cannot be shut off by switch.)
(2) Fails off (Power cannot be turned on.)
(3) Short to ground
(4) Internal short (Short across switch contacts.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function•
Power circuits analysis does not include the resistors that
reside between the power circuit and a MDM.
RATIONALE: These resistors provide signal conditioning





This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Display and Controls Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the
NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis
worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets
identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC
Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality,
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode,
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is
compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under
the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :






NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12601-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO COMITTING TO
NIGHT LANDING. ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHOULD BE PERFORMED
ON FAILURES AFTER COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDINGS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF
OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO COMITTING TO
NIGHT LANDING. ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHOULD BE PERFORMED
ON FAILURES AFTER COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDINGS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12602-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P] [ P] [ P] [x] .
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, ERRATIC DISP. IOA FAILURE
MODE; ERROENOUS OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES
WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO
COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDING. ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON THE FAILURE OCCURRING AFTER COMITTING TO A
NIGHT LANDING.





NASA FMEA #: " 05-3-12602-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, DEFECTIVE CRT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO
COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDING. ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHOULD
BE PERFORMED ON A FAILURE AFTER COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDING.





NASA F_EA #: 05-3-12603-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, DATA BUS SELECT 1,2,3,4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, CLOSE, SHORT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL TO TRANSFER. NO FMEA REQUIRED DUE TO CRITICALITY OF 3/3.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2505-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. AFTER
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. CRIT
2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDING.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differentfrom NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN-1. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO COMITTING TO NIGHT
LANDING. AFTER ADDITIONALANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON
THE FAILURE OCCURRING AFTER COMITTING TO A NIGHT LANDING.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO COMITTING TO NIGHT
LANDING. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY, ADDITIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON
FAILURES OCCURRING AFTER COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDINGS.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /_ 3
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE.


















NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED.
CLOSED. NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT.
OF HUD IS CRITICAL.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
RPC NORMALLY CLOSED WHEN USE













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. CRIT 2/IR IF FAILURE DETECTED PRIOR TO
COMITTING TO NIGHT LANDING. ADDITOINAL HAZARD ANALYSIS OF THIS
FAILURE OCCURS AFTER COMITTING TO A NIGHT LANDING. AFTER
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITIES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12130-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO
DIFFERENCES.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT TO BFC. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12130-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF PWROUTPUT TO NWS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
NO OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF PWR TO 1 OF 3 PWR SUPPLIES. IOA
FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO NWS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ALL REDUNDANT ITEMS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VEHICLE STATUS
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12130-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO 1 OF 3 PWR SUPPLIES.
FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12130-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASAFAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DDU - DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D&C/EPD&C
203
DDU - DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
W.H. TRAHAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.














DDU - DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED, SHORT
CONTACT TO CONTACT SWITCH AND CB NORMALLY CLOSED.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF POWER OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS
OF POWER OUTPUT. NO DIFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12200A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET E )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12200B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF POWER OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS
OF POWER OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12200B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS POWER OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
ERRONEOUS POWER OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, (CDR). IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, (PLT). IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN OFF, SHORT TO CASE AT ON, POLE
TO POLE SHORT, (CDR). IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO
DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN OFF, SHORT TO CASE AT ON, POLE
TO POLE SHORT. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12102-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.














CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE AUGHE-OF-ATTACKS REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12110-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF MACH/VEL. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.









LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE M/VEL REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12110-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF DRAG ACCEL. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.














CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE ACCELERATION REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF EAS. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE EAS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2004-I
NASA DATA: ,
BASELINE [ ]






AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
D&C/EPD&C
409
AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES
W.H. TRAHAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND, CONT TO CONT. IOA
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONALANALYSIS IOA AGREES
WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO
DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12156-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12111-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO ouTPUT.
RANGE NOT A CRITICAL DISPLAY REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. RNG NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12121-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-MODE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES
WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12121-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-MODE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12121-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-MODE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12122-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12158-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12159-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12160-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.











HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12122-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12123-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12123-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.














HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12115-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 601
ITEM: AVVI - ALT ACCEL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12115-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: AVVI - ALT ACCEL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. NO
RF_:
NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.











ITEM: AVVI - ALT ACCEL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05_3-12115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 603
ITEM: AVVI - ALT RATE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO















AVVI - ALT RATE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12115-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 605
ITEM: AVVI - ALT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12115-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 607
ITEM: AVVI - RDR ALT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AVVI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE






HDW/FUNC A B C
0
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, OPENS PREMATURELY. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. ALT NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT. CRIT NOT RAISED. NO
ACTION REQUIRED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AVVI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AWI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














AWI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO
DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12135-2
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: II01
ITEM: METER, EVENT TIMER











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12135-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: METER, EVENT TIMER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12137-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND, CONT TO CONT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12136-1
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 1106
ITEM: SWITCH - START/STOP











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12138-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1107
ITEM: SWITCH - SET/RESET
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12139-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH - THUMBWHEEL- MIN/SEC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN OR SHORT TO GROUND.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12125-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ADI FUNCTION. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO
OUTPUT. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12155-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12125-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.
NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBLITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW
RES PONS E.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12153-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF VISIBLITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12126-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12126-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12127-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12127-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12154-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12128-1
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1212
ITEM: ADI-MODE SEL SW











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12140-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12141-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN
A POSITION OTHER THAN THE ONE SELECTED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12141-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFRENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12141-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND, CONT TO CONT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFRENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNINGELECTRONICSUNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ONE OF 38 CHNLS, DRV FAI. IOA FAILURE
MODE; NO OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFRENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF BACKUP OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO
OUTPUT. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFRENCES.











NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
D&C
1401
CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)
E.E. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF FAIL ANNUNCIATOR OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; NO OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFRENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNINGELECTRONICSUNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF MASTER ALARM OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; NO OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFRENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNINGELECTRONICSUNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF AURAL TONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO
OUTPUT. LOSS OF AURAL TONE DOSE NOT COMPROMISE THE MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA i [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF AURAL TONE TO 8-OHM SPEAKERS.
FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS OPERATING WITHIN LIMIT.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF DISCRETE TELEMETRY OUTPUT. IOA
FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION & WARNINGELECTRONICSUNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF POWER AND/OR SIGNAL. IOA FAILURE
MODE; NO OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.














CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NOT CRITICAL FOR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN LAMP, ONE OF A PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE;
FAIL OPEN. NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE
OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. NOT CRITICAL FOR CREW/VEHICLE
SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12313-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1405
ITEM: C/W STATUS DISPLAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATIONS. NO DIFFERENCES.. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE')




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOAFAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATIONS. NO DIFFERENCES.. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W ANNUNCIATORLAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE; FAIL OPEN. NO
DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D&C
1409
C/W ANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
E.E. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] CP] CP]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE; FAIL OPEN.
SAFETY IMPACT IF OPERATING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN
LIMITS.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12311-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W ANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE; FAIL CLOSED.
SAFETY IMPACT IF OPERATING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN
LIMITS.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12311-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W ANNUNCIATORLAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT. IOA FAILURE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO SAFETY IMPACT IF OPERATING SUBSYSTEMS ARE
OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12332-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODES; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODES; FAIL
TO SWITCH. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12332-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODES; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12332-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODES; FAILED
MID-TRAVEL. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATIONS. NO DIFFERENCES.
]
]





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATIONS. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
D&C
1418
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
E.E. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.















NEW [ X ]
D&C
1419
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
E.E. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATION. NO DIFFERENCES.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; OPEN CIRCUIT.
SAFETY IMPACT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION COMPLETION.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12316-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED IN ONE POSITION. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED TO SWITCH. NO DIFFERENCES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO CASE. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED TO
SWITCH. NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING
WITHIN LIMITS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12314-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, NO OUTPUT, SHT TO GND.
FAILURE MODE; FAILS TO SWITCH. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12307-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W LIMIT SET FUNCTION (SET/ctr/READ)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN, CLOSED, CONT TO CONT SHT TO GND.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12308-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W LIMIT SET LIMIT (UPPER/LOWER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN, CLOSED, CONT TO CONT SHT TO GND.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12306-1
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 1425
ITEM: C/W LIMIT SET VALUE











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, ERR OUTPUT, SHT TO GND. IOA
FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12317-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W PARAMETER STATUS (TRIPPED/ctr/INHIBITED)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12317-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W PARAMETER STATUS (TRIPPED/ctr/INHIBITED)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATION. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12318-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12318-1
NASA DATA:'
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE;
INADVERTENT OPERATION. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12333-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12333-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
MID-TRAVEL. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12305-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ "]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12305-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NORMAL MODE OF OPERATION IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12305-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; PREMATURE CLOSE. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12305-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
I
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. SWITCH NORMALLY IN CLOSE POSITION.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILS TO CLOSE.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1435
ITEM: C/W A, C/W B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT. IOA
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES
WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.













C/W A, C/W B, PWR CKT
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL TO OPEN CIRCUIT.











ITEM: C/W LIMIT MODULE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NONE. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT.
OF PARAMETER ALUES HAVE NO SAFETY IMPACT ON MISSION OR
CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS



















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ / ] [










C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12309-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SUPPLY.






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND.












NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12368-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12379-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE ' [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12384-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C






NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12386-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12372-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12375-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
_DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2601-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2601-3
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2602-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ 3 *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND, FAIL TO CONDUCT.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] t ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12331-1
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12331-2
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12331-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN PREMATURELY. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12345-i
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CAT




NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF A PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.



















_EW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12365-1
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12360-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORTS. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE STATUS REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12390-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT
LEAD ANALYST : W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSE, POLE TO POLE, CONTACT TO CONTACT.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSE. CIRCUIT NORMALLY CLOSED DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2602-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1603
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, POLE TO POLE, CONTACT TO CONTACT.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT POLE TO POLE. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
CLOSED. CKT NORMALLY CLOSED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12331-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] IN] [N] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
r 3 /3
(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]







NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT.
FAILED CLOSED. CKTNORMALLY CLOSED.
IOA FAILURE MODE;











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
CLOSED. CKT NORMALLY CLOSED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12331-6
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1603
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT




NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED PREMATURELY. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED CLOSED. CKT NORMALLY CLOSED.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF A PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF A PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILED ANNUNCIATOR. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.



















[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
C 3 13 ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN LIGHT BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT.




















NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C P ] [ P ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.












LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT, OPEN, SHT TO GND. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN BULB, ONE OF PAIR OUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
t
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, FAILS OPENS, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
o
C / ] [ ] [ ] [







NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF DISPLAY.
NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12103-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS DISPLAY. IOA FAILURE MODE;
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12103-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS DISPLAY. IOA FAILURE MODE;
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]













(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, DIM CAP, INSUF LIGHT.
FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO ILLUMINATION, INSUFF ILLUM. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12410-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO ILLUMINATION, INSUFF ILLUM, NO DIM CAP.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [







NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, INSUFF ILLUM.
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA FAILURE





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12414-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, INSUFF ILLUM. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12415-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, PWR, SHT TO GND.









NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12416-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] • [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, INSUF ILLUM. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12506-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, NO LIGHT OUTPUT.

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, NO LIGHT OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE DOES NOT RAISE THE
CRITICALITY OF THE COMPONENET. NO ACTION REQUIRED.











" NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, DIM CAP, INSUF LIGHT.
FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12404-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHT TO GDN, NO DIM CAP. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:





IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12411-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; WIPER SHORT TO GND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12363-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAILED OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12705-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, NO LIGHT OUTPUT.









NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12709-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF ILLUM, NO LIGHT OUTPUT.























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ILLUMINATION FOR NIGHT OPERATION MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12804-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ILLUMINATION FOR NIGHT OPERATION MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12805-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ILLUMINATION FOR NIGHT OPERATION MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; RPC NO OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND.









NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; RPC LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND. IOA
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND.



























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ .] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [OH]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND.









NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, SHORT. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, SHORT. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, OPEN, CONT TO CONT.





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2506-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ " ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT SHORT TO GND.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, POLE TO POLE SHORT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:






IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN, POLE TO POLE SHORT. IOA FAILURE
MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE, FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORTS TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILS
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2215-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILS
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED CONTACT TO CONTACT.









NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL TO TRANSFER OPEN, CLOSE, CNT TO CNT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT•
FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2208-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORTS POLE TO POLE, CLOSED, CONTACT TO
CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2210-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, CONTACT TO CONTACT INADVERTENT
OPEN OR CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT.
FAILURE MODE; FAILED CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT POLE TO POLE, CLOSED, CONTACT TO
CONTACT. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, NO OUTPUT. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2306-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2603-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED, POLE TO POLE, CONT TO CONT.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2101-I
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1901
ITEM: INSTRUMENT PWR CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1901
ITEM: INSTRUMENT PWR CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL TO TRANSFER. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2213-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
DIFFERENCES.
NO





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2213-2
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1901
ITEM: INSTRUMENT PWR CKT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; SHORT TO GROUND. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2213-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 1902
ITEM: INSTRUMENT PWR CKT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:






IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12175-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPEN, ELEMENT OPEN. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12356-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12358-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ALL CREDIBLE MODES. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED
OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:





IOA FAILURE MODE; FAILED OPEN. NO











FUSE - MPS INDICATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, FAILS OPEN, PREMATURELY OPENS.
FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
CRITICALITY OF THE ITEM.
IOA
IOA'S FAILURE MODE DOES NOT RAISE THE
NO ACTION REQUIRED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE - APU & HYD INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. MONITORING FUEL NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT. NO ACTION
REQUIRED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12150-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE')




NASA FAILURE MODE; NO INDICATION. IOA FAILURE MODE; NO OUTPUT.
AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO
DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12150-2
NASA DATA:
. BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; ERRONEOUS INDICATION. IOA FAILURE MODE;
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH
NASA'S CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL SHORTS POLE TO POLE. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. AFTER ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY. NO DIFFERENCES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN ON POS. IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL
CLOSED. NO DIFFERENCES.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN OFF POS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL CLOSED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO RESPOND TO VEHICLE STATUS
REQUIRING CREW ACTION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL CLOSED IN OFF POS. IOA FAILURE MODE;
FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.







































209 DDU (CDR) CB
210 DDU (PLT) CB
211 DDU (CDR) SW









107 HUD PWR SW
ii0 HUD RPC
106 HUD RESISTOR
1439 C & W


























This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
06, Analysis of the Displays and Controls Subsystem FMEA/CIL (01
December 1987). Prior results were obtained independently and
documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity.
Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not
previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the
hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function
performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified,
and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase
are determined as described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA and cIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode
effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case
criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or Vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of Which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













LOSS OF PWR OUTPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE DDU ENVOKE MDF. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROLLERS. CDR AND
PILOT DDU COOLED BY COMMON AIDR DUCT. LOSS OF AIR DUCT MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF BOTH DDU'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: " 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. CDR AND
PLT DDU COOLED BY COMMON AIR DUCT. LOSS OF AIR DUCT MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF BOTH DDU DUE TO OVERHEATING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













LOSS OF POWER OUTPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI_: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ALL CONTROLLER FUNCTIONS. CDR AND PLT DDU'S ARE COOLED BY
COMMON AIR DUCT. LOSS OF THIS AIR DUCT MAY CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH
DDU'S DUE TO OVERHEATING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ALL CONTROLLER FUNCTIONS. CDR AND PLT DDU'S ARE COOLED BY
COMMON AIR DUCT. LOSS OF THIS AIR DUCT MAY CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH
DDU'S DUE TO OVERHEATING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DDU'S REDUNDANTLY POWERED. LOSS OF ICB NOT DETECTED IN FLIGHT,
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE LOSS OF
CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014, 015
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DDU'S REDUNDANTLY POWERED. LOSS OF ICB NOT DETECTED IN FLIGHT,
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE LOSS OF
CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : i/15/88
SUBSYSTEM: D&C








































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROLLERS IN THE AFFECTED STATION IS LOST.
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS OF ALL
REFERENCES:




























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CONTROLLERS IN THE AFFECTED STATION IS LOST.
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS OF ALL
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 83V73A4 (BAY 3A)
PART NUMBER: MC409-0012-0031
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FIRST POWER SUPPLY, NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SECOND POWER
SUPPLY NO ALERT GIVEN. FAILURE WILL INTERRUPT FUEL CELL COOLING
OPERATION MAY CAUSE ON EXPLOSION DUE TO OVERHEATING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










































LOCATION: PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
PART NUMBER: MC434-0075-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAMPS WILL NOT BE ILLUMINATE.
ALARM CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION.
SW, RESISTORS, AND TEST SW.
OTHER DISPLAYS, CRT, AND AUDIBLE
CKT CONSIST OF CB, BUS SELECT,
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-If
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
MC434-0283-0003




COULD RESULT IN THE CREW DOWNMODING WHEN NOT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/04/88 E-12
APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
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